The 2024 radiation storm that caused a warning: the paper finds, the flights didn't show it

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Reporting from Geneva

An alert was in the air and over most of the planet's surface. The aircraft it was meant to reach were not.

+50 µSv/h MAXIMUM ADDED DOSE RATE

160 µSv TOTAL ADDED DOSE

+2.6% EXCESS CANCER RISK

On 10 May 2024, a coronal mass ejection struck Earth's magnetosphere and triggered a geomagnetic storm that reached G4 — severe — on the NOAA scale. Auroras were seen as far south as Alabama and northern Spain. Satellite operators logged anomalies. Power grids in Scandinavia and Canada tripped protective relays. And, for a few hours, the radiation environment at cruising altitude changed in ways that the people responsible for protecting aircrew from it had not fully anticipated.

A paper published in *Space Weather* on 14 March 2026 by a team led by Dr. Hannah Okoro at the Geneva Institute for Atmospheric Physics (GIAP) argues that the storm delivered a measurable, and in places significant, extra dose of ionising radiation to crews and passengers on routine flights. The paper's central claim is not that anyone was harmed. It is that the system designed to warn them was not ready, and that the gap between the warning and the reality is now large enough to matter.

A geomagnetic storm, briefly explained

The Sun ejects vast clouds of magnetised plasma in events called coronal mass ejections, or CMEs. When one of these clouds reaches Earth, it can compress the magnetosphere, the invisible shield that deflects most of the charged particles streaming from space. The compression can be violent enough to open temporary holes in the shield, through which those particles pour.

Most of the time, the atmosphere does the rest of the work. Air molecules absorb the incoming radiation long before it reaches anyone on the ground. Aircraft, flying above much of the atmosphere, are exposed. The higher and more polar the route, the more exposed it is. Crews on long-haul flights over the Arctic and Antarctic already receive, on average, more than twice the annual dose of a desk worker. They are classified as occupationally exposed to radiation for that reason.

The 10 May storm was the strongest geomagnetic storm since the Halloween storms of October 2003. It was also, in the words of the paper, "the first one we were actually ready to measure properly."

Two dosimeters, one flight, two answers

The GIAP team's evidence comes from a single flight: Geneva to Reykjavík, departing at 06:40 local time on 10 May, with the storm already underway. Two passengers carried personal dosimeters as part of a separate study on pregnancy and occupational exposure. Their devices recorded the dose they received during the flight.

The team then compared those readings with the dose predicted by the standard model used by airlines and regulators, a tool called the Atmospheric Radiation Exposure Model, or AREM. The model is updated every year and is considered reliable under normal conditions.

It was not reliable on this occasion.

Dose received by the dosimeter wearers (corrected for flight, seat and shielding), in µSv

Segment	Dose rate (µSv/h)	Time (h)	Dose (µSv)
Pre-storm baseline	3.1	1.2	3.7
Storm onset, mid-latitude	9.4	0.8	7.5
Storm peak, high-latitude	52.6	1.6	84.2
Storm decay	18.0	1.4	25.2
Post-storm	3.1	1.0	3.1
Total		**6.0**	**123.7**

Dose predicted by AREM for the same flight, in µSv

Segment	Dose rate (µSv/h)	Time (h)	Dose (µSv)
Pre-storm baseline	3.0	1.2	3.6
Storm onset, mid-latitude	4.1	0.8	3.3
Storm peak, high-latitude	14.2	1.6	22.7
Storm decay	6.0	1.4	8.4
Post-storm	3.0	1.0	3.0
Total		**6.0**	**41.0**

Source: GIAP, Okoro et al., *Space Weather*, 2026, Table 2. Dosimeter values are the mean of the two devices, corrected for seat position and aircraft shielding.

The model underestimated the dose by a factor of three. For the segment that crossed the storm's peak, it was off by a factor of nearly four. The paper's authors are careful not to call this a failure of the model in general. It is a failure of the model in a specific, and specifically foreseeable, circumstance.

What the model got right

AREM is built on decades of measurements from ground stations and from satellites that sit outside the magnetosphere. It is very good at describing the radiation environment when the Sun is quiet. It is also good at describing the slow, predictable changes that follow the solar cycle. What it is not built to do is respond, in real time, to the sudden arrival of a CME.

That is not a criticism so much as a description of its job. The model was never designed to issue warnings. It was designed to produce long-term averages for regulators setting annual limits. The problem is that airlines have begun to use it, and to treat its outputs, as if they were warnings.

What a warning would have changed

The paper's most practical section asks what would have been different if the storm had been forecast. The answer is: quite a lot, for the crews on the high-latitude segment.

Dose saved on the 10 May flight if a warning had been issued, by action taken, in µSv

Action	Dose saved (µSv)	Reduction (%)
Descend to lower altitude (FL310 → FL240)	58.4	47.2
Divert to lower-latitude track	71.9	58.1
Delay departure 4 h	123.7	100.0
Cancel flight	123.7	100.0

Source: GIAP, Okoro et al., *Space Weather*, 2026, Table 4. Assumes the dosimeter-measured dose rates and a warning issued at least 30 minutes before the storm peak.

Descending to lower altitude, where the atmosphere is thicker, would have cut the dose by nearly half. Diverting to a lower-latitude track would have done more. Delaying departure by four hours, until the storm had passed, would have avoided it entirely.

None of these options is free. Descending burns more fuel. Diverting adds time and can mean missing connections. Delaying a departure costs money and disrupts schedules. The paper does not argue that every flight should do any of these things. It argues that the decision should be made by someone who knows the dose is coming, rather than by someone who finds out afterwards.

The gap between the warning and the reality

The Space Weather Prediction Center, part of the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, issued a G4 watch for the storm at 02:00 UTC on 10 May. The watch was upgraded to a warning at 04:30 UTC. The flight from Geneva departed at 06:40 UTC, two hours after the warning was issued.

The crew on the flight did not receive a warning. They received a routine weather briefing that mentioned "elevated solar activity" and nothing else. The dosimeter wearers, who were not crew, received no briefing at all.

The paper's authors say this is not unusual. Most airlines do not have a procedure for responding to a geomagnetic storm, because most storms are not severe enough to matter. The 10 May storm was severe enough to matter, and the procedure was not there.

Who is responsible for the warning system

The paper is careful to distribute its criticism. The forecasters did their job. The model did its job. The airlines did not do a job that nobody had asked them to do. The gap is between the three, and it is a gap of responsibility as much as of science.

The International Civil Aviation Organization has a working group on space weather. It has been meeting since 2019. Its next meeting is scheduled for September 2026. The paper's authors say they will be submitting a briefing note.

What happens next

GIAP has begun a follow-up study with a larger sample of dosimeter wearers, including flight crew who have agreed to carry the devices on routine rotations. The team is also working with the European Space Agency on a prototype alert system that would issue a dose-rate warning to participating airlines in near real time.

The paper's lead author, Dr. Okoro, said in a statement that the goal is not to frighten passengers. "The dose on any one flight is small," she said. "The point is that it is avoidable, and we have the tools to avoid it. We just have to use them."

Whether the airlines will agree is another question. The paper's publication has already prompted a response from the International Air Transport Association, which said it would "review the findings in consultation with its members." That review is also scheduled for September.

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Sources

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- Nambiar, P. "Inside the Space Weather Prediction Center's Operations Room." *Geneva Science Weekly*, 2025.

Corrections and clarifications

14 March 2026, 09:00 UTC. An earlier version of this article stated that the dosimeter wearers were pregnant. They were participants in a study on pregnancy and occupational exposure, but were not themselves pregnant during the flight. The article has been corrected.

15 March 2026, 14:22 UTC. Added comment from the International Air Transport Association.

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